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Introduction
After allegations that Harvey Weinstein had sexually assaulted
many women appeared on the front page of the New York Times in
October of 2017,1 the #MeToo movement began in earnest.2 Nowadays,
allegations implicating #MeToo concerns as to a company’s employee,
whether or not involving illegal behavior, may result in swift firing or
reprimand; in any event, such allegations cannot appear to be taken
lightly lest the company’s reputation suffer. Lawsuits and shareholder
activism are increasingly focusing on “toxic” “boys club” cultures at

†

Professor and James L. Krusemark Chair in Law, University of Minnesota
Law School. Thanks to the participants at the 2018 Leet Symposium on
Fiduciary Duty at Case Western Reserve University Law School, and
June Carbone, Scott Dewey, Sean Griffth, Eric Hillemann, and Joe
McGrath for very useful input on this project.

1.

See Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual
Harassment Accusers for Decades, N.Y. Times (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/harvey-weinstein-harassment-allegations.html
[https://perma.cc/4RQA-KHLG].

2.

See, e.g., Christen A. Johnson & KT Hawbaker, #Me Too: A Timeline of
Events, Chi. Trib., (Mar. 7, 2019, 9:43 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.
com/lifestyles/ct-me-too-timeline-20171208-htmlstory.html [https://perma.
cc/65CZ-KAB4]; Me Too Movement, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Me_Too_movement [https://perma.cc/QD5X-HAP9] (last visited
Mar. 25, 2019).
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workplaces,3 and going beyond misconduct to consider other issues
relating to gender such as board diversity.4
This development has broader implications for the debate as to
whose interests corporations should be serving: should corporations be
solely or primarily focused on profits for shareholders or should they
also be taking into account the interests of other stakeholders? In
previous work, I have argued that the increasing emphasis on corporate
social responsibility (CSR) and environmental, social, and governance
(ESG) concerns is leading to a convergence between these supposed
alternatives; here, I make the case with specific reference to #MeToo,
outlining a rhetorical strategy by which the convergence might be more
successful.

3.

See Kevin LaCroix, Nike Board Hit with Sexual Misconduct-Related Derivative
Suit, D&O Diary (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.dandodiary.com/2018/10/
articles/director-and-officer-liability/nike-board-hit-sexual-misconductrelated-derivative-suit/ [https://perma.cc/9N7L-J7LB] [hereinafter LaCroix,
Nike Board] (reporting shareholder lawsuit against Nike’s Board of
Directors that alleges Nike’s board allowed a “toxic ‘boys club’ culture”);
David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Corporate Governance Update:
Shareholder Activism is the Next Phase of #MeToo, Harv. L. Sch. F.
on Corp. Governance and Fin. Reg. (Sept. 28, 2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/09/28/corporate-governance-updateshareholder-activism-is-the-next-phase-of-metoo/ [https://perma.cc/MDW86AKS] (describing recent shareholder proposals regarding sexual
harassment, gender diversity, and the gender pay gap); Ryan Vlastelica,
Why the Wave of Sexual Harassment Allegations Won’t Have an Impact
on Stock Prices, MarketWatch (Dec. 15, 2017, 3:14 PM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/why-the-wave-of-sexual-harassmentallegations-wont-have-an-impact-on-stock-prices-2017-12-15 [https://perma.
cc/MAE5-TQ24] (referencing sexual-misconduct related lawsuits against
companies such as Netflix, Amazon, and CBS); Tag Archives: Sexual
Harassment, D&O Diary, https://www.dandodiary.com/tags/sexualharassment/ [https://perma.cc/U868-ZNSX] (last visited Mar. 25, 2019)
(listing articles on sexual-misconduct related law suits); Peter J. Biging
& Heather M. Zimmer, Corporate D&O Liability and Sexual Harassment
in the Workplace, Am. Bar Ass’n. (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.
americanbar.org/groups/gpsolo/publications/gpsolo_ereport/2018/november
-2018/corporate-d-o-liability-sexual-harassment-workplace/ [https://perma.
cc/KY3F-G37L] (referencing lawsuits brought by investors for the manner
in which company boards have handled sexual harassment allegations).

4.

Katz & McIntosh, supra note 3; American Business and #MeToo,
Economist (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.economist.com/business/2018/
09/27/american-business-and-metoo [https://perma.cc/TSZ5-387X]; see also
Equileap, https://equileap.org/ [https://perma.cc/E6S6-RFE5] (last visited
Mar. 25, 2019) (discussing Equileap, a global organization that advocates
for gender equality in the corporate sector).
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I.

Sexual Misconduct

Since the #MeToo movement began in earnest, many business
executives, media figures, and other prominent people have been subject
to allegations of sexual misconduct.5 What has happened to these
people? There have been a range of responses, some more serious, and
some more warranted than others.6 As noted above, it is clear that
behavior that was once acceptable no longer is. Indeed, some of the
more serious misconduct seems to have been an open secret,7 but the
executives responsible for the misconduct were nevertheless signed to
new employment agreements.8 What the board knew in some of the
cases may be litigated, but there are indications of some level of board
knowledge in at least the Weinstein case and perhaps in the
comparatively less egregious case of Les Moonves, now-former CEO of

5.

Post-Weinstein, These Are the Powerful Men Facing Sexual Harassment
Allegations, Glamour (Dec. 1, 2018), https://www.glamour.com/gallery/
post-weinstein-these-are-the-powerful-men-facing-sexual-harassmentallegations [https://perma.cc/XD23-LR2V] (listing nearly 100 famous
men accused of sexual misconduct).

6.

See id. (detailing both the general fallout and the accused’s reactions to
sexual misconduct allegations against public figures). Allegations are easy
to make, and the set of people alleged to have committed sexual
misconduct is surely not coextensive with the set of people who have
actually done so, nor is it even a subset of those people.

7.

See infra note 9 and accompanying text.

8.

See Harvey Weinstein Employment Agreement, available at https://
www.documentcloud.org/documents/4495391-Weinstein-Employment.html
[https://perma.cc/7ZQ7-CJ6Y] (showing that Weinstein’s employment
contract was renewed in 2015, years after Weinstein had been known by
several prominent figures to have acted inappropriately, and included
provisions apparently evidencing an awareness that Weinstein might
commit misconduct); Leslie Moonves Employment Agreement, available
at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/813828/000119312507222104/
dex10.htm [https://perma.cc/3VK5-7K7L].
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CBS, as well.9 Weinstein is potentially facing ruinous criminal and civil
liability.10 Moonves, by contrast, is doing much better:
Just months after being fired by CBS, Leslie Moonves is running
a new company. And though Mr. Moonves and his former
employer are locked in a dispute over $120 million in severance,
CBS is paying for the office space that Mr. Moonves now occupies.
The company, Moon Rise Unlimited, operates out of a 10th-floor
suite at 9000 Sunset Boulevard, among the tallest buildings in
West Hollywood. A glass-sheathed office tower with expansive
views of Los Angeles, it can be seen from miles away and is near
entertainment industry beehives like Soho House and Chateau
Marmont. Mr. Moonves was forced out of CBS in September after
multiple women accused him of sexual misconduct. In December,
the company officially said he was fired, citing “willful and
material misfeasance, violation of company policies and breach of
his employment contract.” His exit agreement, however, states
that CBS must pay for Mr. Moonves’s “office services” for no less
than a year, even if the company fired him for cause. CBS
declined to comment.11

This account, notwithstanding being in the news section of a
prominent newspaper, seems to convey the reporter’s disapproval.
Moonves was accused of serious misconduct yet was able to negotiate
an exit agreement under which he receives significant benefits. And
Moonves would, apparently, have a case that he is entitled to receive
9.

Yohana Desta, What Exactly, Did the Weinstein Company Know About the
Harvey Weinstein Allegations?, Vanity Fair (Oct. 12, 2017), https://
www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2017/10/harvey-weinstein-company-lawyer
[https://perma.cc/4EVE-KSX8] (suggesting that Weinstein’s board knew
of confidential settlement agreements between Weinstein and women in
2015); Dade Hayes & Nancy Tartaglione, Weinstein Co. Board Has
Known About Payoffs to Women Since 2015: Report, Deadline (Oct. 12,
2017), https://deadline.com/2017/10/weinstein-co-board-knew-payoffs-towomen-since-2015-report-1202186928/ [https://perma.cc/76PX-L9AK]; CBS
Higher-Ups Knew of CEO Leslie Moonves’ Sexual Misconduct and Did
Nothing, Report Finds, Women World (Dec. 5, 2018), https://
womenintheworld.com/2018/12/05/cbs-higher-ups-knew-of-ceo-lesliemoonves-sexual-misconduct-and-did-nothing-report-finds/ [https://perma.cc/
62G8-JQNJ] (indicating that a CBS board member was privately
informed of Moonves’ misconduct in 2007).

10.

Jan Ransom, 5 Ways Harvey Weinstein’s Lawyers Plan to Fight the
Accusations Against Him, N.Y. Times (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/09/21/nyregion/weinstein-sexual-assault-defense.html
[https://perma.cc/DT6H-5BMY].

11.

David Gelles et al., Les Moonves, Fired by CBS, Sets Up Shop in
Hollywood, N.Y. Times (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
02/08/business/media/les-moonves-moonrise.html [https://perma.cc/6AUR6Y56].
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his $120 million severance. There are many media reports that criticize
the possibility that he could receive severance under these
circumstances.12
This outcome is in part a story of CEO employment agreements
that make firings for cause very difficult indeed.13 For instance, often,
being convicted of a misdemeanor, or being indicted on felony charges
but not being convicted, does not yield for-cause firing.14 One article
suggests that Moonves not getting severance “could signal a shift in the
#MeToo quest to hold abusers accountable—a new data point that
gives the existing scatter plot coherent shape.”15
It will be interesting to see what the lawsuits and other pressures
yield. Certainly, there have been firings, and interestingly, many of the

12.

See, e.g., Vanessa Romo, CBS Denies Former CEO Les Moonves $120
Million Severance Package, NPR (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.npr.org/
2018/12/17/677587813/cbs-denies-former-ceo-les-moonves-120-millionseverance-package [https://perma.cc/GLV7-DTR6] (explaining that CBS
fired Moonves for cause and he is not entitled to severance). But see
Bloomberg, Les Moonves Wants His $120 Million Severance and He’s
Going to Fight CBS for It, Fortune (Jan. 17, 2019), fortune.com/
2019/01/17/les-moonves-cbs-severance/ [https://perma.cc/JX52-8N6Y]
(stating that Moonves is demanding arbitration following CBS’s decision
to withhold severance).

13.

See generally Robert A.G. Monks & Nell Minow, Corporate
Governance 269–70 (5th ed. 2011) (noting that in the backdrop of the
famous case In Re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 907 A.2d
693 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005), Disney could not justify for-cause termination
of Ovitz, even though there was general consensus that Ovitz had not
done a great job); Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good
Faith, and Structural Bias, 32 J. Corp. L. 833 (2007).

14.

See Mark J. Oberti, 5 Things All Execs Should Have in Employment
Agreements, The Bus. J. (Aug. 29, 2013, 7:00 A.M. EDT), https://
www.bizjournals.com/bizjournals/how-to/human-resources/2013/01/5things-all-execs-should-have-in.html [https://perma.cc/JXS3-YH5G]
(advising executives to seek narrow definitions of “cause” for termination
in their employment agreements, covering only “conviction of a felony,
embezzlement, theft or gross misconduct connected with work”); see, e.g.,
Harvey Weinstein Employment Agreement, supra note 8, at 12–13; Leslie
Moonves Employment Agreement, supra note 8, at 13–14 .

15.

Mary Childs, How Les Moonves’ Zero Tolerance Could Be a Turning
Point in Harassment Suits, Barron’s (Dec. 21, 2018, 7:58 PM ET),
https://www.barrons.com/articles/how-les-moonves-severance-could-changethe-math-of-sexual-harassment-suits-51545440338 [https://perma.cc/2PWX8B4B].
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men fired have been replaced by women.16 Female representation seems
to be increasing on boards as well.17

II. Profit Maximizing Firms and Sexual Misconduct
Corporations have duties to their shareholders, notably, to earn
profits. But to whom else do they owe duties, and what do those duties
entail? Different people have different views about this issue and,
ultimately, many of the differences are matters of first principle, not
really amenable to resolution.18 The question we can approach, though,
is: what maximizes profits? Obviously, companies spend enormous
amounts of time considering this question, and they proceed according
to their best assessment of the answer.
I am presently exploring whether certain business practices that
seem to increase profits by reducing costs might have ancillary effects
that limit, if not eliminate, the effect of the cost reductions. Imagine
trying to save money on wages by hiring Worker B for 50 percent of
the wage of the previous Worker A, only to find out that Worker B is
less than 50 percent as productive as Worker A. Worker A may have
friends who might shun the business, not being willing to work or shop
there. Worker B's income is, by hypothesis, quite low, and he may not
be particularly well-disposed to his company. The aggregate effect may
be that the labor cost savings may be more than offset by increased
production costs, increased costs in finding employees, and reduced
demand. Worker B, who was ostensibly saving money for the company,
turns out to ultimately cost money instead.
Another example involves a company's imposition of overly
aggressive sales targets. Such targets may encourage overly aggressive
sales tactics. The result may be that more honest employees quit and
are replaced by employees whose willingness to lie for the company
might be matched by their willingness to lie to the company. A third
example hits closer to the topic of this Article: a company’s assessment
that a particular executive who engages in sexual or other misconduct
brings value to the company that outweighs the costs of the behavior.
The behavior may be worse than what the company thinks it is
overlooking, or its assessment of how the behavior will be regarded once
it becomes known may understate the costs, which may include
16.

Audrey Carlson et al., #MeToo Brought Down 201 Powerful Men. Nearly Half
of Their Replacements Are Women., N.Y. Times (Oct. 29, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/23/us/metoo-replacements.html
[https://perma.cc/7DRM-KJ2R].

17.

Quick Take: Women on Corporate Boards, Catalyst (Dec. 21, 2018),
https://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/women-corporate-boards [https://
perma.cc/G3HM-8RLJ].

18.

Claire A. Hill, An Identity Theory of the Short- and Long-Term Investor
Debate, 41 Seattle U. L. Rev. 475, 475–76 (2018).
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penalties, increased regulatory scrutiny, and other results of
reputational loss.
In the face of pressure from various realms, even a company taking
the position that its only stakeholders are shareholders seeking profit
could conclude that profit maximization is not always furthered by
aggressive cost-reduction or revenue-maximization strategies or by not
punishing (or even rewarding) its executives notwithstanding the
executives’ bad behavior. Especially as to the latter, but to some extent
also as to the former, even a profit-maximizing company would not
want to be caught making precise computations as to respects in which
it gets close to, or perhaps crosses, a line (usually of legality, but
perhaps even morality). Imagine a company being caught having made
an assessment that the expected benefits of an “interaction” with
Government Official X are $10,000, whereas the expected costs,
including as to the possibility that the “interaction” is considered a
bribe, are $8,000. Or, imagine a company being caught making an
assessment that whatever settlement monies it has to pay for Harvey
Weinstein’s conduct were worth it, given how valuable an employee he
was. Thus, even on profit maximization grounds, a company might
want to estimate the costs associated with sensitive matters less
conservatively.19
Certainly, as to conduct in the general category addressed by
#MeToo, it seems likely that more generous assessments of expected
costs are being made. Companies are now going further than a more
conservative cost/benefit analysis would suggest in attempting to
prevent, minimize, or ex post address the conduct. They are, perhaps,
making a generous computation as to the reputational cost if sexual
misconduct by a top official is discovered (and probably even if credibly
alleged). In fact, we do not really know what the bottom-line effect of
sexual misconduct allegations on a company will be. Some of the worst
stock price effects seem to reflect not so much the misconduct itself,
but rather the anticipated departure of the executive whom markets
had perceived as valuable.20 Harvey Weinstein’s company went into
bankruptcy. But in that case, the allegations were numerous, serious,
and credible, and the company was so closely associated with Weinstein

19.

Claire A. Hill, Caremark as Soft Law, 90 Temple L. Rev. 681, 687–88
(2018); Claire A. Hill, Marshalling Reputation to Limit Problematic
Business Conduct, 99 B.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2019).

20.

See Ryan Vlastelica, Why the Wave of Sexual Harassment Allegations
Won’t Have an Impact on Stock Prices, MarketWatch (Dec. 15, 2017),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/why-the-wave-of-sexual-harassmentallegations-wont-have-an-impact-on-stock-prices-2017-12-15 [https://
perma.cc/P7BE-XZYD] (noting, for example, a dip in 21st Century Fox
Inc.’s stock after former network chairman Roger Ailes was accused of
sexual misconduct and then subsequently departed the company).
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that, once he was terminated, there was virtually nothing left.21 That
being said, however, the situation is dynamic. An important part of the
#MeToo story is that behavior that was previously tolerated no longer
is. My own life experience provides data points for this proposition. In
my practice experience in the 1980s, suggestive remarks, gestures, and
invitations of certain sorts by male clients directed at female lawyers
were common and considered unremarkable; nowadays, it is apparently
far more remarked upon (and less accepted). Will investors start doing
more to punish firms that are considered not to be taking #MeToo
seriously enough? And what are the costs of regulatory and “public”
disfavor to a firm?22 We don't know. Finally, whatever the effect on
investors, regulators, and others, the costs of “managing” the crisis
might be factored in as well, again supporting spending more to prevent
or limit difficulties.
The foregoing argues that even a profit-maximizing firm might do
more than a conservative instrumental calculation might suggest in
order to prevent or minimize the costs of certain #MeToo harms. Firms
that characterize themselves as profit-maximizing, concerned only
about profits and shareholders, might go further for reasons of
managerial agency costs: going further might benefit the directors more
than the firm, insofar as the directors were also taking costs to
themselves into account.
What sort of costs? To some extent, the “costs” are ones that the
law wants them to take into account: the costs of personal liability for
engaging in or not doing enough to prevent illegal conduct. “Pure”
theory would regard these as agency costs, while any kind of ordinary
understanding would not. If the expected benefit of bribing official A
or concealing the criminal conduct of executive B is positive after taking
into account the costs, notably the size of the bribe, the executive’s
salary, and the probability of detection and punishment of the firm,

21.

Weinstein was terminated on October 8, 2017, and the company declared
bankruptcy in March 2018. Brooks Barnes, Harvey Weinstein, Fired on
Oct. 8, Resigns From Company’s Board, N.Y. Times (Oct. 17, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/17/business/media/harvey-weinsteinsexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/VZF9-R84S]; Brooks Barnes,
Weinstein Company Files for Bankruptcy and Revokes Nondisclosure
Agreements, N.Y. Times (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
03/19/business/weinstein-company-bankruptcy.html [https://perma.cc/
TKA4-8JRW].

22.

See John Armour et al., Putting Technology to Good Use for Society: The
Role of Corporate, Competition and Tax Law 9–10 (European Corp.
Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 427/2018), https://ecgi.global/sites/
default/files/working_papers/documents/finalarmourenriquesezrachivella1.
pdf [https://perma.cc/YFU8-TTLS] (discussing the distinction between
market reputation and political reputation).
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then the perfect agent would bribe/conceal. 23 But of course, this
reasoning is to be rejected; we cannot countenance directors’
participation or facilitation of law breaking even if doing so would yield
profit for their corporations. This reasoning should also allow directors
to go beyond the minimum necessary in this context. A recent paper,
summarized by the authors in the following blog post, discusses the
types of claims that could be made against directors in relation to sexual
harassment by company executives:
In our article, “Sexual Harassment and Corporate Law,” we
identify various legal arguments available to shareholders who
seek to hold directors and officers responsible for corporate sexual
misconduct. We conclude that in some instances, corporate
fiduciaries will indeed be liable to shareholders when workplacebased sexual misconduct occurs at their companies. First and
most straightforwardly, corporate fiduciaries violate their duties
of care and loyalty when they engage in harassment themselves—
and thus put the firm’s resources and reputation at risk for their
own personal gratification. Second, fiduciaries who fail to monitor
harassment at their firms may be liable in certain circumstances
under a Caremark theory. Third, corporate fiduciaries who are
aware of harassment but fail to react—or who affirmatively
enable harassment to continue—may be sued for breach of the
duties of care and loyalty, though this is the category in which
the doctrinal case for liability is likely the weakest. Fourth,
corporations and their officers and directors face potential
liability under the federal securities statutes when they make

23.

Directors breach their fiduciary duties if they engage in conduct involving
illegality (that is, engaging in it themselves or being culpable for not
ferreting it out, as is alleged in Caremark cases) even if on balance there
is a net profit for the corporation, an issue Brett McDonnell and I discuss
in Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76 Fordham L.
Rev. 1769, 1784 (2007). We argue that most fiduciary duties are a way
for shareholders to limit directors’ and officers’ ability and incentive to
benefit themselves at the expense of their corporation, but:
a stark divergence between directors’ interests and those of
shareholders is not in any obvious way what is at issue. Illegal
behavior may very well maximize corporate profits; indeed, we
would expect that it often would. Paying an illegal bribe in
country Z is intended to get you more business in country Z.
Often, a company’s (non-U.S.) competitors are not subject to
antibribery rules, and if the U.S. executive follows the rules, he
will lose business to the competitor that can bribe without fear of
legal sanction.
Id.
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inaccurate or misleading statements regarding workplace sexual
misconduct.24

Firms that characterize themselves as profit-maximizing might go
further for other reasons as well. Directors are concerned about their
reputations and might take #MeToo preventing and minimizing steps
for that reason. Is that an agency cost? Again, assuming that the firm’s
aims are characterized as profit maximization for shareholders, one
could characterize the directors’ actions as an agency cost insofar as
what they are doing benefits their individual reputations (and perhaps
saves them the trouble of defending their reputations) rather than
benefiting the firm.

III. Beyond Sexual Misconduct
The advent of the #MeToo movement has brought together and
made more salient as one phenomenon issues surrounding women in the
workplace. As two commentators explain:
As the #MeToo movement continues to make itself felt in all
facets of American life, public company boards of directors that
are newly focused on the issue of workplace harassment have seen
corporate responses evolve. In recent months, many boards have
overseen the addition of anti-harassment policies to corporate
codes of conduct, the establishment of procedures for addressing
allegations, and the enhancement of employee training at all
24.

Daniel Hemel & Dorothy Lund, Sexual Harassment and Corporate Law,
CLS Blue Sky Blog (Apr. 9, 2018), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/
2018/04/09/sexual-harassment-and-corporate-law/ [https://perma.cc/XF4LPWKB]. Some of the lawsuits include securities law claims alleging that
companies did not disclose the problematic behavior of one or more
executives (Wynn Resorts; CBS); alleging that the directors breached
their fiduciary duties in not preventing such behavior and in attempting
to conceal it (Nike; 21st Century Fox); and alleging that executives were
rewarded for engaging in such behavior with generous severance packages
that caused employees to revolt (Google/Alphabet, for example). Kevin
M. LaCroix, Sexual Misconduct and D&O Claims, D&O Diary (Apr. 11,
2018), https://www.dandodiary.com/2018/04/articles/director-and-officerliability/sexual-misconduct-claims/ [https://perma.cc/UGW6-5QJ7]; Kevin
M. LaCroix, Investor Files Sexual Misconduct-Related Securities Suit
Against CBS, D&O Diary (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.dandodiary.
com/2018/08/articles/securities-litigation/investor-files-sexual-misconductrelated-securities-suit-cbs/ [https://perma.cc/Q98Q-NK9N]; LaCroix,
Nike Board, supra note 3; Kevin M. LaCroix, Alphabet Board Hit with
Derivative Suits over Alleged Sexual Misconduct at Google, D&O Diary
(Jan. 13, 2019), https://www.dandodiary.com/2019/01/articles/directorand-officer-liability/alphabet-board-hit-derivative-suits-alleged-sexualmisconduct-google/ [https://perma.cc/DTM4-P562] [hereinafter LaCroix,
Alphabet].
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levels. Directors are taking proactive steps toward educating
themselves and looking deeply into the issues involved, and many
have highlighted it as a priority for the senior management team.
Boards that have successfully installed the nuts and bolts of good
governance in this area can now step back and consider the larger
project of gender equality in corporate America, in which sexual
harassment, corporate culture, gender pay equity, and gender
diversity are related issues. Shareholder activity in all four of
these areas—which we will call collectively, “corporate
equality”—has markedly increased, and boards looking ahead to
the next phase of corporate governance activism should take note
of this trend and try to be proactive as opposed to reactive.25

Another commentator speaks to the role of sexual harassment
lawsuits in this regard:
[One of the cases against Google] not only refers to sexual
misconduct involving Google executives, but also refers to the
sexual discrimination in the male-dominated company culture
that the complaint alleges has resulted in gender based pay and
advancement disparity. The shareholder derivative lawsuit filed
last summer against Nike . . . raised similar gender disparity
allegations. The issue of gender-based pay disparity is an arguably
related but different issue than the kinds of over sexual
misconduct and harassment issues on which many of the
#MeToo-related D&O lawsuits are based.
If the focus of the #MeToo social media movement were to
move more generally from the sexual misconduct-type allegations
and more toward gender based pay and advancement disparity,
the wave of revelations could sweep much more broadly and the
scope of the follow-on litigation could expand significantly as
well.26

The author points out that two of the complaints in the cases
against Google “refer to a toxic male-dominated culture.” He notes that
“‘brogrammer culture’ . . . is not found just at Google . . . . [T]he
implication is that the toxic conditions at Google can be found at other
tech companies—which in turn suggests that other tech companies also
could find themselves the target of this kind of litigation.”27

25.

David A. Katz et al., Corporate Governance Update: Shareholder
Activism Is the Next Phase of #MeToo, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp.
Governance and Fin. Reg., (Sept. 28, 2018), https://corpgov.law.
harvard.edu/2018/09/28/corporate-governance-update-shareholder-activismis-the-next-phase-of-metoo/ [https://perma.cc/2E8E-HYJB].

26.

LaCroix, Alphabet, supra note 24.

27.

Id.
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This suggests that various pressures are being brought to bear to
encourage companies not just to minimize or prevent sexual
misconduct, but also, to deal more broadly with problems associated
with women in the workplace, at both junior and senior levels. In an
almost tautological way, so long as the efforts requested of companies
are not that costly and also do not affirmatively harm their profitmaking missions, these efforts could be consistent with profit
maximization for shareholders as the sole corporate mission. If, for
instance, having some percentage of women on a board is not
demonstrably bad for profits and if the constituencies making the
request have to be attended to (if, for instance, they are major
shareholders), the company surely is not going against its profitmaximizing mission to assent. Because the matters at issue are difficult
to investigate, it will not be possible to determine with enough certainty
what effect women on boards have on profitability; thus, it will not be
clear whether or not profitability is positively or adversely affected,
leaving room for other pressures to affect decisions as to board
composition.28
A similar stance can be taken regarding the effect of any of these
initiatives on reputation. What does (and does not) and would (and
would not) affect reputation is the subject of considerable debate. Given
the complexities involved and the dynamic nature of the issue and
reactions to it, it is easy to couch a comprehensive program addressing
many #MeToo issues, such as the avoidance of sexual misconduct and
harassment, the encouragement of “good” things such as diversity on
boards, and, perhaps, pay equality for women, as consistent with profit
maximization.

IV. Returning to Profit Maximization and CSR
In 2018, Larry Fink, CEO of Blackrock and one of the biggest
institutional investors in the world, wrote a letter to CEOs that has
been quite influential as a call to corporations to act more for the long
term and more in the public interest.
Society is demanding that companies, both public and private,
serve a social purpose. To prosper over time, every company must
not only deliver financial performance, but also show how it
makes a positive contribution to society. Companies must benefit
all of their stakeholders, including shareholders, employees,
28.

Does Gender Diversity on Boards Really Boost Company Performance?,
Knowledge@Wharton (May 18, 2017), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.
edu/article/will-gender-diversity-boards-really-boost-company-performance/
[https://perma.cc/N3AC-DMN8] (summarizing studies about the impact
of having women on corporate boards and concluding that the results do
not indicate a negative impact to businesses with women on the board).
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customers, and the communities in which they operate. Without
a sense of purpose, no company, either public or private, can
achieve its full potential.29

Fink also made the case for boards that are diverse, including as to
gender:
We also will continue to emphasize the importance of a diverse
board. Boards with a diverse mix of genders, ethnicities, career
experiences, and ways of thinking have, as a result, a more diverse
and aware mindset. They are less likely to succumb to groupthink
or miss new threats to a company’s business model. And they are
better able to identify opportunities that promote long-term
growth.30

Some commentators have suggested that Fink’s letter is just “good
PR.”31 There are also respects in which, notwithstanding his “all things
to all people” language, there are real tensions at issue and very difficult
societal questions—that being “all things to all people” is not actually
possible and perhaps not even desirable. And finally, there are very real
questions as to what is in society’s interests. Still, especially with
memories and traces of the 2008 financial crisis remaining, there is a
general sense that corporations have sometimes been forces for harm
and could, many believe should, be forces for good.
But what does that entail beyond avoiding harm? Some
commentators argue—or even assert—that corporations should, for
reasons of good corporate citizenship or for some other like reason, go
what some might consider “above and beyond.” Not surprisingly, a
search for the term “Corporate Social Responsibility” on Google yields
245,000,000 hits;32 a search for “Environmental Social Governance”
yields 233,000,000 hits.33 Many commentators argue or simply assume
that corporations “should” engage in certain “good” behaviors “because
29.

Larry Fink, Larry Fink's 2018 Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose,
BlackRock (2018), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/
2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/H5MT-4WF8].

30.

Id.

31.

See, e.g., Jeff Hauser & Eleanor Eagan, BlackRock’s ‘Greenwashing’
Threatens to Undermine Climate Action, Am. Prospect (Feb. 26, 2019),
https://prospect.org/article/blackrocks-greenwashing-threatens-undermineclimate-action [https://perma.cc/6894-F7QR].

32.

Corporate Social Responsibility, Google, www.google.com (search for
“Corporate Social Responsibility”) [https://perma.cc/47SL-M7X9] (last
visited Mar. 22, 2019).

33.

Environmental Social Governance, Google, www.google.com (search for
“Environmental Social Governance”) [https://perma.cc/ZY8N-HQBN]
(last visited Mar. 22, 2019).
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it is the right thing to do,” whether or not those behaviors are profit
maximizing. My argument here suggests that the relationship between
these behaviors and profit maximization is not straightforward and that
the supposed tension may be overstated.
My broader aim is to argue that costs associated with certain types
of behaviors, notably including additional reputational costs and the
costs of potential legal liability and regulatory disfavor, are such that
firms will have profit-maximizing reasons to minimize the behaviors.
But doesn’t my reasoning support giving weight to any sort of
strong pressure by a constituency against an entity, whether or not the
pressure is for something “good” for the broader society?34 Companies
could deal with pressures from #MeToo instrumentally and
atomistically. They could determine, crudely, that they will listen to
the louder and seemingly more important and influential pressures and
either follow their dictates or appear to do so, focusing on harm
minimization and taking some affirmative steps that the company
decides are sufficiently warranted or will appease enough of the right
people. That is, they could respond narrowly. But alternatively, they
could also take up Fink’s charge, and the broader charge of the
increasing forces favoring corporate good citizenship and be pro-active,
not just as to particular issues but more holistically.

34.

I have attempted in other works to develop a principled basis to
distinguish among various pressures. See Claire A. Hill, Repugnant
Business Models: Preliminary Thoughts on a Research and Policy
Agenda, 74 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 973 (2017); Claire A. Hill, Cheap
Sentiment, 81 L. & Contemp. Probs. 67 (2018); Claire A. Hill,
Marshalling Reputation to Limit Problematic Business Conduct, 99 B.U.
L. Rev. (forthcoming 2019).
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